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THE IMMUNITY OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL
Public officials are generally accorded some type
of immunity from civil damage actions resulting
from their performance of official functions.' The
doctrine of immunity is based on the principle that
it is unjust to punish a public official who has
attempted to perform his job in good faith. More-
over, there is a fear that unlimited liability will
prevent a public official from properly performing
his functions.2 Public officials, either state or fed-
eral, can receive one of two types of immunity.
Officials performingjudicial or quasi-judicial func-
tions are accorded absolute immunity that com-
pletely bars suits against them for actions taken
within the scope of their office.3 Other officials
receive qualified immunity that only protects them
against suits based on errors made in good faith; a
cause of action still lies if the official makes an
intentional or malicious error.4
In determining the scope of immunity applicable
to the United States Attorney General, courts have
looked primarily to the case law concerning
prosecutorial immunity. 5 This is not surprising in
light of the similarity between the functions of the
United States Attorney General and a prosecutor.
6
'See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 987 (4th ed.
1971).2 See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
'See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978).
' See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974).
5 See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir.
1979); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In
determining the scope of immunity accorded prosecutors,
courts can look both to cases brought against state pros-
ecutors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) as well as to
constitutional actions brought against federal prosecu-
tors. The immunity accorded to state officials is equiva-
lent to that accorded to their federal counterparts. Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).6 The United States Attorney General has far greater
duties than an ordinary prosecutor. He must, for exam-
ple, give legal advice to the President and other branches
of the government and publish and distribute his opin-
The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case con-
cerning the scope of immunity applicable to the
United States Attorney General, but the Court has
begun to outline the contours of prosecutorial im-
munity. In Imbler v. Pachtman7 the Court held that
"in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State's case" a prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer
and thus absolutely immune from suit. But this
case only answered part of the question as the
Court did not rule on the proper scope of immunity
applicable to a prosecutor acting as an investigator
rather than as an advocate.
Most courts, both before and after Imbler, have
held that when a prosecutor acts as an administra-
tor or as an investigator, he receives only a qualified
immunity.8 But the courts that have made this
ions. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 511-513, 521 (1976). But the basic
activities of the United States Attorney General, like all
other prosecutors, consist of investigating crime and ini-
tiating prosecutions. Compare 28 U.S.C. §§ 515, 518, 519,
533 (1976) with H. KERPER, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 432-34 (1972). It should be noted
that the only cases decided on the question of the scope
of immunity of the United States Attorney General have
involved activities that all prosecutors would undertake.
See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979)
(ordering an investigation); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d
83 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (arrest, detention and prosecution).
It is likely that at some point there will be civil suits
challenging the legality of activities unique to the United
States Attorney General which cannot be analogized to
prosecutorial immunity.
7 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
'See Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 21 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249, 1256 (1st Cir.
1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608
(7th Cir. 1973); Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 410
(7th Cir. 1972); Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330,
335 (9th Cir. 1968); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533,
536-37 (9th Cir. 1965); Tomko v. Lees, 416 F. Supp.
1137, 1139 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
There are cases that have not drawn the line between
investigative and administrative activities as opposed to
advocacy activities. But these cases have not used the
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distinction seem to ignore a footnote at the end of
the Imbler majority opinion in which the Court
noted:
We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in
his role as advocate for the State involve actions
preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and
actions apart from the courtroom. A prosecuting
attorney is required.., to make decisions on a wide
variety of sensitive issues. These include questions
of whether to present a case to a grand jury, whether
to file an information, whether and when to prose-
cute, whether to dismiss an indictment against par-
ticular defendants, which witnesses to call, and what
other evidence to present. Preparation, both for the
initiation of the criminal process and for a trial,
may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluat-
ing of evidence. At some point, and with respect to
some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions
as an administrator rather than as an officer of the
court. Drawing a proper line between these func-
tions may present difficult questions, but this case
does not require us to anticipate them.9
This footnote implies that obtaining evidence may,
in some circumstances, be a quasi-judicial activity
which should be accorded an absolute immunity.
In a recent opinion by the Third Circuit, Forsyth
v. Kleindienst,'0 the court used this footnote as the
basis for its holding that any investigative activity
of the Attorney General conducted for the purpose
of gathering information "necessary to a prosecu-
tor's decision to initiate a criminal prosecution" is
absolutely immune from civil suit.t Although this
holding appears to follow logically from the foot-
note in Imbler, a closer analysis of the Forsyth rule
will reveal that it is both unsound and unworkable.
The rule, which focuses on the purpose of the
investigative activity as a basis for the determina-
tion of the scope of immunity to be afforded, will
force trial courts to undertake a difficult motive
analysis. Furthermore, the distinction drawn by
the court is unsupported by the policy considera-
tions underlying the doctrine of absolute immu-
nity.
proper analysis. In Imbler the Court rejected all ap-
proaches other than a functional analysis in which the
scope of immunity is determined by the nature of the
function being performed. Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S.
409 (1976). See Hillard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded in light ofImbler v. Patch-
man, 424 U.S. 961, rev'don remand, 540 F.2d 220 (6th Cir.
1976) (scope of prosecutor's immunity based on the le-
gality or illegality of his actions).
11424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
'0 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 1215.
The Forsyth case was an appeal from two separate
actions12 brought against several former Attorneys
General, two Directors of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and several FBI agents. Both suits
sought damages for allegedly illegal wiretaps that
were ordered by the Department ofJustice without
first obtaining a search warrant. The warrantless
wiretaps were ordered in 1971, which was before
the Supreme Court held in United States v. United
States District Court13 that most wiretaps required
prior judicial approval. The plaintiffs in both cases
asserted a cause of action under the first, fourth,
sixth and ninth amendments to the Constitution
and 18 U.S.C. § 2520.1' The defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that they were enti-
tled to absolute immunity. Both of the district
courts denied the motions for summary judgment
and held that the defendants were entitled to only
qualified immunity for ordering wiretaps.' 5 The
Forsyth case is a consolidated appeal of the two
denials of summary judgment. 16 The court's opin-
ion was limited to a discussion of the type of
immunity appropriate for the Attorney General. 7
The Forsyth court held that Imbler required a
functional analysis of the immunity question. The
immunity of a public official should be determined
by the functions he performs, rather than by his
"status or title."' I In undertaking certain activities,
a prosecutor functions as an officer of the court
(quasi-judicial officer) and, like a judge, should
receive absolute immunity. But in performing cer-
tain other functions, the prosecutor no longer acts
as a quasi-judicial officer and should only receive
qualified immunity. The Forsyth court noted that
although the Supreme Court in Imbler left the
precise borderline between these areas undefined,
,2 Burkhart v. Saxbe, 448 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 447 F. Supp. 192 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
13 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
,4 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1976).
15 448 F. Supp. at 588; 447 F. Supp. at 192.
is Denial of a summary judgment is appealable as a
final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) when it involves
a right that is separate from and collateral to the rights
asserted in the action. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Forsyth court
permitted the appeals because part of the purpose of
absolute immunity is the right not to be subjected to
trial. This right is lost if the denial of summary judgment
is not independently appealable. 599 F.2d at 1207-09.
7 The court did not discuss any of the other defend-
ants, except for the FBI agents, because of their nominal
connection with the case. 599 F.2d at 1209 n.6. The court
did briefly discuss the immunity of the FBI agents, id. at
1216-17, but a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope
of this recent trend.
'
8 Id. at 1212.
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at least one point was clear; the decision to initiate
a prosecution is a quasi-judicial activity that is
absolutely immune from suit.' 9 The court then
drew the conclusion that since "the decision ... to
initiate a prosecution is not made in a vacuum,"
subjecting the Attorney General to liability for
gathering the information necessary to make such
a decision could only "foster uninformed decision-
making.' 20 Based solely on this consideration, the
Forsyth court extended the absolute immunity of a
prosecutor to investigative activities closely related
to the decision to initiate a prosecution. Both cases
were remanded to the district courts for a factual
hearing to determine the nature of the investiga-
tions for which the wiretaps were used.21
PRAGMATIC PROBLEMS
The Forsyth decision attempts to distinguish two
types of investigations: those investigations specif-
ically related to the decision to initiate a particular
prosecution (specific investigations) as opposed to
the more general type of investigations which are
not specifically directed toward an anticipated
prosecution (general investigations). 22 The distinc-
tion drawn by the court essentially leads to a
motive analysis; the trial court will be required to
determine why the Attorney General ordered a
particular investigation. This inquiry into motive
is the inevitable outcome of the Forsyth rule because
the same act of investigation, wiretapping, can
receive a different degree of immunity depending
upon how the Attorney General intended to use
the information gathered by the investigation.
It must be emphasized that in a Forsyth situation,
the plaintiffs are challenging the order to investi-
gate.2 How the information is actually used once
the investigation is completed is only circumstan-
tial evidence of whether the order was a quasi-
judicial activity. For example, an investigation un-
dertaken with a firm intent to bring legal action
may turn up evidence that forces a decision not to
prosecute, whereas a general investigation may
turn up evidence that leads to a prosecution. Thus
the trial court cannot rely heavily on whether there
was in fact a prosecution in making its determi-
nation of the purposes for which the investigation
was ordered.
The only direct evidence of the Attorney Gen-
eral's intent would be the testimony of the Attorney
'
9 Id. at 1213.
20 Id. at 1215.
21 Id. at 1217.
2Id. at 1214-15.
23 Id. at 1205.
General himself. But the Attorney General's testi-
mony regarding his intention will rarely be useful
because he will be facing a possible damage judg-
ment and will have an interest in establishing the
motive most favorable to himself. Courts will thus
be forced to make a generalized inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding an investigation in an
attempt to determine the purpose of the investi-
gation. This will probably produce a situation in
which trial courts will weigh the strength of the
evidence in the possession of the Attorney General
before he ordered the investigation and then make
their own determinations of whether a prosecution
was being contemplated.
Motive determinations are, of course, not impos-
sible. Legal principles should not be discarded
simply because they are difficult to apply. But
given the difficulties involved in using a motive-
based standard, the Forsyth rule can only be justi-
fied if it is solidly supported by the relevant policy
considerations. The Forsyth court's decision presents
an unworkable rule, however, because in addition
to the pragmatic problems that it presents, it is
unsupported by the policy considerations under-
lying the doctrine of immunity.
THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
The Forsyth court gave absolute immunity to
certain types of investigations in order to avoid a
situation that would promote uninformed decision-
making.H Unfortunately, this is a conclusory ra-
tionale that does not answer the crucial question.
It is not likely to be disputed that a prosecutor
needs to be immune from suits based upon his
investigative activity, but the real question is why
was qualified immunity deemed insufficient pro-
tection? Police officers, for example, are constantly
called upon to make difficult decisions in the course
of investigations, yet they are only accorded qual-
ified immunity. Since the court provides no per-
suasive rationale for its extension of immunity, a
full analysis of the Forsyth holding will first require
a determination of what policy considerations are
required to justify a grant of absolute immunity.
The doctrine of absolute immunity has its roots
in the common-law immunity that has always been
given to judges. In Bradley v. Fisher25 the Supreme
Court discussed the major policy consideration
underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity.
Bradley involved a situation where, at the end of a
trial, a judge accused one of the attorneys of har-
24Id. at 1215.
25 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
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assing the bench. The judge ordered the attorney's
name stricken from the list of attorneys permitted
to practice before that court. The Court held that
although the attorney should have been given a
chance to defend himself against the judge's accu-
sations, the actions by the judge were well within
the scope of his office and thus, despite the impro-
priety, absolutely immune from suit.
2 6
The main concern of the Bradley Court was the
threat of retaliatory suits by those dissatisfied with
a judge's decisions. The Court pointed out that
trials often involve "not merely great pecuniary
interests, but the liberty and character of the par-
ties."' 27 The Court felt that these highly emotional
situations will frequently lead to retaliatory suits,
many of which will be frivolous. Without absolute
immunity from civil suits, a judge would not be
able to exercise the free and independent judgment
necessary to a fair trial.8 Thus the Court felt that
permitting any kind of suit against ajudge, includ-
ing those based only on malicious actions, would
have a detrimental effect on his job performance.
29
The doctrine of absolute immunity was extended
to prosecutors in Yaselli v. Goff.' The court held
that in bringing prosecutions, prosecutors act as
quasi-judicial officers and, like judges, are likely to
be subjected to a large number of retaliatory suits
in response to their decisions. The court noted, as
the Bradley Court had, that the propensity for
retaliatory suits may affect the job performance of
a quasi-judicial official. The court also noted an
additional problem which was likely to affect a
public officer who might be the target of a high
number of retaliatory suits. Even if it was obvious
that all of the suits would fail, "the most innocent
26 A judge's immunity, like any immunity, is limited
to those actions taken within the scope of his office: See
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,355-57 (1978); Lynch
v. lohnson, 420 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1970).
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348.
28 Id. at 347.
'The independence of the judiciary has always been
of special concern in the federal system. Article III of the
Constitution attempts to maintain this independence by
guaranteeing a lifetime appointment (barring bad behav-
ior) and by preventing Congress from lowering judicial
salaries. These provisions received "almost complete as-
sent" during the Constitutional Convention. See P. BA-
TOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART &
WESCHLER'S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTE.m 6-7 (2d ed. 1973).
30 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
Several lower courts had held that prosecutors could
receive an absolute immunity prior to this case, but this
was the first time the Supreme Court upheld this reason-
ing.
council might be unrighteously harassed with
suits." 3' The court was implying that a grant of
qualified immunity would not provide a sufficient
solution to the harassment problem. Qualified im-
munity requires a trial on the issue of good faith,
but absolute immunity will bar a suit on the basis
of the pleadings.3 2 Therefore, without absolute im-
munity, a public official who is likely to be the
subject of retaliatory suits will be prevented from
performing his job simply by the enormous amount
of time he may have to waste in court proving his
good faith.
The primary considerations underlying a grant
of absolute immunity are those discussed by the
Bradley and Yaselli courts. A public official whose
duties will generate a high number of retaliatory
suits may not be able to act effectively because of
fear of reprisal and because of the sheer amount of
time wasted defending suits. But the Supreme
Court has noted a third and crucial prophylactic
consideration which acts as a limitation on the
extension of immunity. In Imbler v. Pachiman the
Court noted the problems caused by retaliatory
suits, but also cautioned that a public officer should
only be granted absolute immunity when there are
other specific means of controlling his actions.3
The Court pointed out that in a trial situation, the
system of appellate review always constitutes a
check on the prosecutor's actions and thereby en-
sures the defendant a fair trial. In fact, the adver-
sary nature of the trial itself ensures that all of a
prosecutor's actions will be subjected to close scru-
tiny.' In addition, a prosecutor's conduct can be
regulated by ethical proceedings under the Amer-
ican Bar Association Code of Professional Respon-
sibility.35 Thus the public has a viable means of
curtailing malicious conduct by a prosecutor with-
out subjecting him to civil liability.
3' 12 F.2d at 402 (quoting Munster v. Lamb, 11 Q.B.D.
588).
32 See Dodd v. Spokane County, 393 F.2d 330,335 (9th
Cir. 1968) (case remanded to the district court because a
defense of good faith could not be determined from the
pleadings). See generally Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957) (a case cannot be dismissed on the pleadings
unless the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief").
3 See 424 U.S. at 428-29. The Court held that prose-
cutors, in bringing prosecutions, are absolutely immune
from civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 424 U.S.
at 427.
-4 424 U.S. at 427.2sId. at 429. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court
recently heard a case challenging a prosecutor's actions
at trial on ethical grounds. In re Friedman, 76 Ill. 2d 392,
392 N.E.2d 1333 (1979).
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The absolute immunity of judges and other
quasi-judicial officers36 should be contrasted with
the qualified immunity of police officers. Police
officers provide a good example of a public official
accorded only qualified immunity. In addition,
they perform many functions quite similar to, and
in close cooperation with, prosecutors.3 7 Police of-
ficers are accorded only a good faith immunity for
common-law actions as well as for suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3 .s8 Unfortunately, courts generally
approach the issue of the proper scope of immunity
for a police officer by questioning whether a police
officer should receive any immunity at all.39 While
there are no opinions which analyze the reasons
why a police officer should not receive absolute
immunity,40 an examination of the policy consid-
erations underlying the doctrine of absolute im-
munity will reveal why this protection is withheld
from police officers.
A grant of absolute immunity is necessary only
when there is an unusually large threat of retalia-
tory suits and this only arises in litigation situa-
tions.4' A police officer's actions may generate some
retaliatory action, but not with the same frequency
or vehemence of those involved in litigation. A
litigation situation usually produces a losing party,
and the loss can involve anything from large
amounts of money to the loss of an individual's
liberty and reputation.4 2 A police officer's actions
36 In addition to prosecutors, there are other quasi-
judicial officers that are accorded absolute immunity. See
Silver v. Dickson, 403 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1968) (state
parole board members); Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d
678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966) (state bar association members
in disciplining members of the bar); Turpen v. Booth, 56
Cal. 65, 69 (1880) (grand jurors).
37 Police officers and prosecutors often arrive at the
scene of a crime together and work closely on the subse-
quent investigation. See 2 MANUAL FOR PROSECUTING AT-
TORNEYS 432 (M. Ploscowe ed. 1956); Barrett, Police Prac-
tices and Law - From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L.
REv. 11, 21 (1962). In fact, the Forsyth case involved a
wiretap ordered by an Attorney General but executed by
FBI agents. 599 F.2d at 1205.
38See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). In
addition, federal "police officers" such as FBI agents also
receive qualified immunity. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
3 386 U.S. at 555.
40 For example, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972), the court deter-
mined whether a police officer should be absolutely im-
mune from suit. After a discussion of the proper way of
analyzing the question, the court concluded, without
explanation, that "the benefit to society derived from the
protection of personal liberties outweighs the detriment
of perhaps deterring vigorous police action." Id. at 1346.
4' Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 512.
42 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348.
can produce at most a temporary loss of privacy or
an injury. In addition, a police officer's activities
are only subject to judicial review if the case he
was working on goes to trial and there is a sup-
pression hearing in which his investigative methods
are challenged as the basis for excluding the evi-
dence he has gathered.43 In all other situations, a
citizen is powerless to challenge a police officer's
actions except in a civil suit. The actions of a
prosecutor and a judge, on the other hand, are
always subject to the rigors of an adversary proce-
dure with appellate review. The special considera-
tions that justify granting absolute immunity to
judicial and quasi-judicial officers stem from the
trial situation and are thus not present in police
activities.44
An attempt to determine the proper scope of
immunity for the United States Attorney General
must begin by analyzing the functions he performs
in light of the relevant policy considerations. It
must first be determined whether there is a like-
lihood of a great number of retaliatory suits that
may affect the Attorney General's performance or
waste too much of his time and, in addition,
whether there are sufficient controls over his activ-
ity to act as an alternative protection for citizens.
The Forsyth opinion presents two separate ques-
tions. First, one must determine whether the dis-
tinction the court drew between general and spe-
cific investigations is viable in light of the policy
considerations. Second, if it is not a viable distinc-
tion, what sort of immunity should investigative
activities be accorded?
The Forsyth opinion establishes two categories of
investigations-the specific and the general. The
first point to consider is whether specific investi-
gations will generate a greater number of retalia-
tory suits than general investigations. It can be
argued that a specific investigation, with the added
threat of prosecution, might generate more hostility
than a general investigation. But this argument
43 The most common means of challenging a police
officer's actions is a pretrial motion to suppress illegally
seized evidence. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12 (4th ed. 1974).
" Some commentators have presented alternative ex-
planations for the fact that police officers are only af-
forded a qualified immunity. One commentator has ar-
gued that as the rank of an official increases, he will be
more aware of the total situation and thus more cautious
in his actions. In addition, higher officials are more
subject to public opinion. Developments in the Law-Remedies
Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV. L. REv.
827, 835-36 (1957). This explanation is refuted by the
case of Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974), where
the governor of a state was given only qualified immunity.
NOTES [Vol. 71
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does not withstand close analysis. First of all, in a
great many situations, it is doubtful that the sub-
jects of an investigation will be aware of its purpose.
This often will be true in situations where the
prosecutor ordered a specific investigation but
eventually chose not to prosecute. Even in situa-
tions where a prosecution is eventually initiated, it
is impossible to determine a priori whether specific
investigations will in fact produce a greater number
of retaliatory suits than general investigations. It is
quite simple to hypothesize a situation where the
opposite could be true. A prosecutor might be
about to proceed with a prosecution, but be in
need of one additional piece of information. To
gain this piece of information, he may need to tap
one phone for a one-day period. But a prosecutor
could conduct a general investigation of someone's
activities that might include placing a tap on all of
a person's private and business phones for several
months. To some, the first type of investigation,
with the added threat of a prosecution, may prove
more offensive than a general investigation. But it
is also likely that many people would find the
general investigation, without any threat of a pros-
ecution, far more offensive. The only reasonable
conclusion to draw from this is that it is impossible
to tell, absent some overwhelming empirical evi-
dence, whether specific investigations will provoke
a greater number of retaliatory suits than general
investigations.
If it cannot be said with a reasonable degree of
certainty that specific investigations will provoke a
greater number of retaliatory suits, there can be no
justification for giving a different degree of im-
munity to specific as opposed to general investiga-
tions. But even assuming one could prove that
specific investigations would provoke greater hos-
tility than general investigations, the Forsyth dis-
tinction would still not be justified. Courts have
been concerned that a large number of retaliatory
suits could have two effects on a public official:
they might affect his performance and they might
waste too much of his time.45 But if absolute im-
munity is granted to only specific investigations,
neither of these two problems will be solved. The
Forsyth distinction is so vague that it is doubtful an
Attorney General will be able to predict, with
confidence, into what category an investigation
falls. Except in a few obvious situations, he will
have to assume that a court may find his activity
to be a general investigation with only qualified
immunity. Absolute immunity is only an effective
protection of an official's performance if the public
45 See text accompanying notes 25-30.
official can determine, in advance, that he is pro-
tected from all lawsuits.
Furthermore, the grant of absolute immunity to
specific investigations will not save the Attorney
General any court time. The Forsyth court was
forced to remand the cases for a "limited factual
hearing' 46 to determine what kind of investigation
the Attorney General had ordered. Given the com-
plexity of all modern day courtroom proceedings,
it will almost certainly take a great deal of time
just to determine what sort of investigation was
ordered. A grant of absolute immunity will only
save a public official's time if it can be used to
dismiss suits on the basis of the pleadings. Since
the grant of absolute immunity solely to specific
investigations will not eliminate a significant
amount of wasted court time for the Attorney
General, there can be no justification for protecting
him from suits based on malicious conduct.47
Since the policy considerations do not indicate
a basis for distinguishing between general and
specific investigations, all investigations ought to
be treated uniformly. This conclusion is further
supported by the pragmatic problems caused by
attempting to draw a distinction based on a pros-
ecutor's motive. in ordering an investigation. Most
courts that have approached this question have
recognized this and held that a prosecutor does not
act as a quasi-judicial officer in conducting inves-
tigations and should therefore only receive quali-
fied immunity.48 This viewpoint appears to be
justified by the relevant policy considerations.
In Butz v. Economou the Supreme Court held that
"federal executive officials exercising discretion are
entitled only to the qualified immunity specified
in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situations
where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity
is essential for the conduct of public business."
''
Investigative activity is not an exceptional situation
mandating the use of absolute immunity. Although
46599 F.2d at 1215.
47 The Forsyth court recognized this argument when it
pointed out that the factual hearing "may result in some
dilution of the protection of absolute immunity." Id.
48 See note 8 supra. One commentator argued that all
investigations conducted by a prosecutor ought to receive
absolute immunity. Note, Delimiting the Scope of Prosecuto-
rial Immunity from Section 1983 Damage Suits, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 173 (1977). The author makes a two-part argument.
First, a prosecutor's investigative and quasi-judicial activ-
ity are so deeply entwined that a meaningful separation
is impossible. Id. at 198-99. Second, if any distinction is
possible, it will be based on a prosecutor's intent. Since
a determination of intent requires a hearing, a funda-
mental purpose of the absolute immunity is thwarted. Id.
at 200.
49 438 U.S. at 507 (footnote omitted).
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investigative activity is likely to stimulate some
retaliatory response, it is not likely to generate the
same reaction that a trial situation does. When the
Bradley Court discussed the reasons for granting
absolute immunity to the Attorney General, it
consistently pointed to the unique aspects of a trial
and the likelihood that a losing litigant might seek
another forum to vent his anger. 5° The Imbler Court
also pointed out the particular resentment that
results from being prosecuted.5' Additionally, the
adversary nature of the trial and the possibility of
appellate review provide a viable means of con-
trolling litigation activity, but they do not protect
the public against improper investigative activity.
All public officials can potentially generate some
antagonism, but it is the unique aspects of a trial
situation that can generate the unusually high
number of retaliatory suits necessary to justify
absolute immunity.
5 2
This discussion demonstrates the continued via-
bility of the common-law distinction between the
immunity appropriate for police officers and for
judges. When a prosecutor investigates, he acts as
a policeman and should only receive qualified
immunity. This conclusion is further supported by
the functional approach to the immunity question
mandated by the Imbler opinion. If one is to deter-
mine the propriety of a grant of immunity on the
basis of the function being performed, all investi-
gations, whether ordered by an Attorney General
or conducted by a police officer, should logically
be treated uniformly.
5°80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 348.
5 424 U.S. at 425.
52 See text accompanying notes 40-41.
The Forsyth holding would permit a situation in
which an Attorney General would be absolutely
immune for ordering an investigation where an
FBI agent would receive only qualified immunity.
The Butz Court, in refusing to grant absolute im-
munity to all federal executive officials, discussed
precisely this problem and pointed out that "[I]t
makes little sense to hold that a Government agent
is liable for warrantless and forcible entry into a
citizen's home in pursuit of evidence, but that an
official of higher rank who actually orders such a
burglary is immune simply because of his greater
authority."-'
The Supreme Court has carefully laid the foun-
dation for a uniform system of immunity that looks
only to the function a public official is performing,
not his rank or position. In Scheuer the Court dem-
onstrated this new approach by holding that the
highest executive official of a state, its governor,
was entitled only to the same qualified immunity
that a police officer received,54 and in Butz the
Court held that federal officials should receive the
same level of immunity as their state counter-
parts.55 The Forsyth decision, on the other hand,
has established a special privilege for the Attorney
General and prosecutors in general that is directly
opposed to the functional approach the Court ap-
plied.
438 U.S. at 505-06.
5 416 U.S. at 245-48. The Court noted that the scope
of qualified immunity may vary with the level of discre-
tion exercised by the public official. In essence, this means
that the degree of immunity will be the same for all
officials performing the same function, but what consti-
tutes good faith will vary.
' 438 U.S. at 300-0 1.
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